Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive e¤ects of partial acquisitions. We propose a generalization to a partial horizontal acquisition setting of the two most traditional indicators used to screen unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects: the Hel…ndahl-Hirschman Index and the Gross Upward Price Pressure Index. The proposed generalized indicators can deal with all types of acquisitions that may lessen competition in the industry: acquisitions by owners that are internal to the industry (rival …rms) and engage in cross-ownership, as well as acquisitions by owners that are external to the industry and engage in common-ownership. Furthermore, these indicators can deal with direct and indirect acquisitions, which may or may not correspond to control, and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. The results seem to suggest that (i) a full merger induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial controlling acquisition involving the same …rms, (ii) a partial controlling acquisition induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial non-controlling acquisition involving the same …rms and the same …nancial stakes, and (iii) an acquisition by owners that are internal to the industry induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than an acquisition (involving the same …rms and the same stakes) by external owners that participate in more than one competitor …rm.
Introduction
Full acquisitions complete and permanently eliminate competition among the …rms involved in the transaction. This constitutes the basic element of a merger analysis. In contrast, partial acquisitions do not completely and permanently eliminate competition among …rms. Nevertheless, they may present signi…cant competitive concerns and, as a consequence, competition agencies have taken an increased interest in assessing their competitive e¤ects.
Following the long theoretical literature in industrial organization, agencies have typically focused on partial acquisitions that give rise to a cross-ownership structure, i.e., acquisitions by owners that are internal to the industry, rival …rms. Some recent examples include the UK Competition Commission assessment of the BskyB's proposed acquisition of a 17:9% stake in ITV and the European Commission assessment of the News Corporation's proposed acquisition of an approximately 25% stake in Premiere.
However, the phenomenal growth of private equity investment in recent years has led agencies to focus also on partial acquisitions that give rise to a common-ownership structure, i.e., acquisitions by owners that are external to the industry, but participate in more than one competitor …rm. A recent example includes the FTC assessment of the Kinder Morgan buyout by (among others) private equity funds managed and controlled by the Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holdings LLC, which already hold a signi…cant partial ownership position in Magellan Midstream, a major competitor of Kinder Morgan.
The competitive e¤ects of partial acquisitions giving rise to cross-ownership or commonownership structures depend heavily on whether the ownership right involved in the acquisition is a …nancial or a corporate control interest. The former refers to the right of the (partial) owner to receive the stream of pro…ts generated by the operations and investments of the acquired …rm, while the latter refers to the right of the (partial) owner to in ‡uence the decisions of the target …rm. We need to identify and distinguish the two rights because partial horizontal acquisitions that do not result in e¤ective control present competitive concerns distinct from partial acquisitions involving e¤ective control. When a party (internal or external to the industry) acquires a partial …nancial interest in a …rm, it acquires a share of its pro…ts. Such acquisition can lessen competition by reducing the incentive of the acquiring party to compete aggressively because it shares in the losses thereby in ‡icted on that rival. On the other hand, when a party (internal or external to the industry) acquires corporate control in a …rm, it acquires the ability to in ‡uence the competitive conduct of the target …rm. Such in ‡uence can lessen competition because it may be used to induce the rival to compete less aggressively against the acquiring party. Brito et al. (2014a) propose an empirical structural methodology to quantitatively assess the unilateral competitive e¤ects of partial horizontal acquisitions. However, competition agencies are typically given a very short period to analyze a potential acquisition upon receiving its noti…cation, with little data available before deciding whether to issue a second request. In this paper, we propose a generalization to a partial horizontal acquisition setting of the two most traditional indicators used to screen unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects: the Hel…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), typically suitable for Cournot homogeneous-product industries, and the Gross Upward Price Pressure Index (GUPPI), typically suitable for Bertrand di¤erentiatedproduct industries.
The proposed generalized indicators bypass the demand estimation required by a structural methodology and can be computed with the data submitted in a typical noti…cation to the competition agency. Furthermore, they can deal with acquisitions that give rise to either a cross-ownership structure, or a common-ownership structure, or both. Moreover, they can also deal with direct and indirect acquisitions of either …nancial interests, or corporate control, or both. 1 This issue is particularly important for antitrust purposes because indirect partial ownership interests may constitute a way of evading antitrust rules that limit direct ownership in rivals. Finally, the proposed generalized indicators nest full mergers as a special case, retrieving the standard HHI and GUPPI typically used in merger simulation.
We also provide an empirical application of the two proposed generalized indicators to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. On December 20, 1989, the Gillette Company, which had been the market leader for years and accounted for 50% of all razor blade units sales, contracted to acquire the wet shaving businesses of Wilkinson Sword in the United States (among other operations) to Eemland Management Services BV (Wilkinson Sword's parent company) for $72 million. It also acquired a 22.9 percent of the nonvoting equity shares of Eemland for about $14 million. On January 10, 1990, the Department of Justice (DoJ) instituted a civil proceeding against Gillette. The complaint alleged that the e¤ect of the acquisition by 1 An owner has an indirect partial ownership interest in …rm B if it holds a partial ownership interest in …rm A and, in turn, …rm A holds a partial ownership interest in …rm B.
Gillette may have been substantially to lessen competition in the sale of wet shaving razor blades in the United States. Shortly after the case was …led, Gillette voluntarily rescinded the acquisition of Eemland's wet shaving razor blade business in the United States, but went through with the acquisition of 22.9% nonvoting equity interest in Eemland. The DoJ approved the acquisition after being assured that this stake would be passive. These two acquisitions (one involving a partial interest and another a full merger), and two additional hypothetical ones, are screened below. The results seem to suggest that (i) a full merger induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial controlling acquisition involving the same …rms, (ii) a partial controlling acquisition induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial non-controlling acquisition involving the same …rms and the same …nancial stakes, and (iii) an acquisition by owners that are internal to the industry induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than an acquisition (involving the same …rms and the same stakes) by external owners that participate in more than one competitor …rm. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 presents the theoretical framework, Section 4 develops the two proposed generalized indicators, Section 5 provides the above mentioned empirical application and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
This section reviews the literature relative to screening indicators for partial horizontal acquisitions within Cournot homogeneous-and Bertrand di¤erentiated-product industries. Table 1 summarizes the schematic of the literature relative to both settings, according to the types of owners and the nature of the partial acquisition.
Cournot Homogeneous-Product Industries
The literature on unilateral e¤ects screening indicators for partial horizontal acquisitions within Cournot homogeneous-product industries began with Reynolds and Snapp (1986) . They examine the impact of acquisitions that give rise to a cross-ownership structure of direct …nancial interests. They show that, in markets where entry is di¢ cult, cross-shareholding by rival …rms involving partial …nancial interests (even if relatively small) could result in lower equilibrium market output and higher equilibrium market prices. They propose to screen such e¤ects using a modi…ed HHI. However, their proposal can not screen acquisitions of corporate control neither of indirect stakes nor of common-ownership by owners that are external to the industry. Bresnahan and Salop (1986) build on Reynolds and Snapp (1986) by introducing the distinction between …nancial interest and corporate control. They consider di¤erent direct …nancial and corporate control cross-shareholding arrangements and propose a set of modi…ed HHIs to screen the unilateral e¤ects of each of those alternative arrangements. However, their proposal can not address acquisitions of all types of corporate control arrangements, neither of indirect stakes nor of common-ownership by owners that are external to the industry. Flath (1992) builds on Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and extends the analysis by treating the more general case in which indirect partial cross-ownership interests are also present. However, to do so, he focus on acquisitions that give rise to a cross-ownership structure of …nancial interests. Further, he does not propose indicators to screen whether the analyzed acquisitions lead to unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects. Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) build on Flath (1992) and propose a modi…ed HHI to screen acquisitions that give rise to a cross-ownership structure of direct and indirect …nancial interests. However, their proposal can not address acquisitions of corporate control arrangements, neither of common-ownership by owners that are external to the industry. O'Brien and Salop (2000) extend Bresnahan and Salop (1986) 's modi…ed HHI to a richer set of …nancial interest and corporate control scenarios. However, to do so, they focus only on direct acquisitions that involve owners that are external to the industry, i.e., they screen the unilateral e¤ects of acquisitions that give rise to a common-ownership structure of direct interests. Their proposal can not screen acquisitions of indirect stakes neither of cross-ownership by rival …rms. We propose to extend the literature by deriving generalizations of both the standard and the modi…ed HHI to screen whether partial horizontal acquisitions lead to unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects for settings involving all types of owners (internal and external to the industry), and acquisitions (direct and indirect, involving control or not, partial or full).
Bertrand Di¤erentiated-Product Industries
The literature on unilateral e¤ects screening indicators for partial horizontal acquisitions within Bertrand di¤erentiated-product industries began with O'Brien and Salop (2000) . They examine the impact of acquisitions that give rise to a common-ownership structure of direct …nancial and corporate control interests. They do so building on Shapiro (1996) 's diversion ratio approach. (2000) - 
The Theoretical Framework
This section introduces the theoretical framework under which the partial horizontal acquisitions'screening indicators (in the context of both Cournot homogeneous-product and Bertrand di¤erentiated-product industries) are derived. The general setting is adapted from Brito et al.
(2014a) to cope with acquisitions that give rise to a common-ownership structure (and are not explicitly addressed in Brito et al., 2014a's application).
The Setup
There are N single-product …rms, indexed by j 2 = f1; :::; N g : There are also K owners, indexed by k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, who may include not just owners n= that are external to the 2 The only exception, although following a di¤erent nature of indicator, is Brito et al. (2014b) . They build on both O'Brien and Salop (2000) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) to extend the analysis to settings involving aquisitions that give rise to both a cross-and a common-ownership structure of …nancial and corporate control interests, either direct or indirect. They propose su¢ cient statistics for the e¤ects of partial ownership (and divestiture of partial ownership) on consumer welfare. However, they do so only for a duopoly setting. industry (and can engage in common-ownership), but also owners from the subset = of …rms that are internal to the industry (and can engage in cross-ownership). 3
As discussed above, the competitive e¤ects of partial acquisitions giving rise to crossownership or common-ownership structures depend heavily on whether the ownership right involved in the acquisition is a …nancial or a corporate control interest. In order to capture the distinction between these two rights, we consider that the total stock of each …rm j is composed of voting stock and non-voting (preferred) stock, with the latter giving the holder a share of the pro…ts but no right to vote for the Board or to participate in other decisions.
The degree of …nancial interest of owner k in …rm j is represented by 0 kj 1, with P k2 kj = 1, which denotes the shareholder's holdings of total stock in the …rm, regardless of whether it be voting or non-voting stock. The degree of corporate control of owner k over the decision making of …rm j is denoted by 0 kj 1, with P k2 kj = 1, a measure of corporate control that will be a function of the owner's holdings of voting stock in the …rm. The larger the holdings of voting stock in a …rm, the greater the degree of control over the decision making will typically be. However the relationship may not necessarily be linear. For instance, an owner holding 49% of voting stock in a …rm may have no control over the decision making of the …rm if one other owner holds 51%. In contrast, an owner holding 10% of voting stock in a …rm may have e¤ective control over the decision making of the …rm if each of the remaining owners hold a tiny amount of voting stock.
Firm' s Aggregate Pro…t
We model …nancial cross-ownership among rival …rms in the lines of Reynolds and Snapp (1986) , Bresnahan and Salop (1986) , Flath (1992) , and Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) . To do so, we distinguish between a …rm's operating and aggregated pro…t. The reason being that, in an industry characterized by cross-ownership among rival …rms, the aggregate pro…t of a …rm includes not just the stream of pro…ts generated by the …rm's own operations, but also a share in its rivals'aggregate pro…ts due to the ownership stake in these …rms.
Let j and j denote the operating and the aggregated pro…t of …rm j 2 =, respectively. 3 The set n= denotes the set excluding the …rms in =.
The operating pro…t, j , is generated by the …rm's own operations and can be written as follows:
where p j , mc j , q j , and c j denote the price, the (assumed constant) marginal cost, the quantity, and the …xed cost, respectively, of …rm j. However, the aggregated pro…t of …rm j includes not just j , but also a share in the aggregate pro…ts of all the rivals in which …rm j has an ownership stake. We make the following assumption regarding the distribution of those pro…ts among rivals:
Assumption 1 Each …rm's aggregate pro…t is distributed among owners proportionally to the total stock owned, regardless of whether it be voting or non-voting stock.
Under Assumption 1, …rm j receives a pro…t stream from its ownership stake in …rm g that corresponds to the percentage jg of …rm g's total stock owned. Therefore, the aggregate pro…t of each …rm j 2 = can be written as follows:
where the second term denotes the returns on the cross-holdings of …rm j in all other rival …rms. 4
The set of the above N aggregate pro…t equations implicitly determines the aggregate pro…t of each …rm as a function of the operating pro…ts of all the …rms in the industry over which the …rm has (direct or indirectly) a …nancial stake on. In order to see why this is the case, let F denote the N N …nancial cross-ownership matrix with zero diagonal elements, jj = 0, and o¤-diagonal elements 0 jg 1 (if j 6 = g 2 =) representing the percentage held by …rm j on …rm g's total stock. Note that the speci…cation allows for the special case of full acquisitions, which just corresponds to setting jg = 1 and jg = 1 for j 6 = g. In vector notation, the aggregate pro…t equations become:
where and are N 1 vectors of aggregate and operating pro…ts, respectively. In order to solve for those pro…ts explicitly, we make the following assumption regarding the cross-ownership …nancial structure of the …rms in the market:
Assumption 2 The rank of (I F ) equals the number of …rms in the market.
Under Assumption 2, matrix (I F ) is invertible, which implies it is possible to solve for the aggregate pro…t equation in terms of the vector of operating pro…ts:
where I denotes a N N identity matrix.
Manager' s Objective Function
We model corporate control cross-ownership, as well as …nancial and corporate control commonownership in the lines of O'Brien and Salop (2000) . To do so, we make the following assumption regarding the objective of the manager of the …rm:
Assumption 3 The manager of the …rm maximizes a (control) weighted sum of the owners returns.
In a standard oligopoly model with no partial ownership interests, barring any market imperfections that preclude e¢ cient contracting between the owners and the manager, the former will typically agree (and give the appropriate incentives) that the latter should maximize pro…ts. However, in a common-ownership setting, owners may have con ‡icting interests and, therefore, may not agree on the best course of action for the …rm. As O'Brien and Salop (2000) argue, an owner of …rm j who also has a large …nancial interest in rival …rm g typically wants …rm j to pursue a less aggressive strategy than the strategy desired by an owner with no …nancial interest in …rm j. In this situation, the manager must weight the con ‡icting interests of the di¤erent owners according to the corporate-control structure of the …rm, which determines each owner's in ‡uence over decision-making within the …rm.
Assumption 3 considers that the owners'interests are captured by their corresponding re-turns and, as such, the objective function of the manager of …rm j can be written as follows:
where kj measures (as described above) the degree of control of owner k over the manager of …rm j, and R k is the return of owner k. 5 Furthermore, it allows for a wide variety of plausible corporate-control structures. Under this formulation, a higher weight on the return of a particular owner is associated with a greater degree of in ‡uence by that owner over the manager. Di¤erent control scenarios then correspond to di¤erent sets of control weights for the di¤erent owners.
The return of owner k 2 varies depending on whether that owner is internal or external to the industry. If the owner is external to the industry, k = 2 =, we can assume it only cares about the returns of equity holding in the di¤erent rival …rms. 6 If, on the other hand, the owner is internal to the industry, k 2 =, we assume it cares about a control weighted sum of the owners equity holdings'returns. In short, the return of owner k can be written as follows: 7
where $ k for k 2 = denotes the normalized objective function of the manager of …rm k. The normalization is in terms of the aggregate pro…ts of each rival …rm k such that the returns of the internal owners can be compared to those of the external owners: 8 5 Without loss of generality, we assume the …rm does not constitute itself as a owner, which translates into the set =j (that denotes the set not including …rm j). Some …rms do possess own shares. However, because a …rm's interests are ultimately their owners interests, in these cases, the control weight of those shares is ultimately distributed among the owners according to their corresponding control weight. 6 Of course, external owners care about the returns of their entire portfolio of holdings, not only those relative to the industry. However, for the purposes of evaluating the unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects of acquisitions, only the latter are relevant. 7 Because an internal owner's interests represent ultimately external owner's interests, it is important to note that the sum of all external onwers returns is indeed equal to the sum of the …rms operational pro…ts. For all k 2 , we have that:
2= g , where 1 denotes a (N 1) vector of ones. 8 As an illustration consider a …rm with two owners (both external): one with a 40% stake and another with a 60% stake (with both stakes involving …nancial and corporate control). The manager of the …rm weights the returns of the two owners (according to their control stake): $ = 0:4R1 + 0:6R2. Assuming that the two external owners do not engage in common-ownership, the objective function of the manager is given by: $ = 0:4 (0:4 ) + 0:6 (0:6 ) = 0:52 . This would suggest that the manager only cares about 52% of the …rm's aggregated pro…t, which is not correct. Absent common-ownership, both owners agree that the manager should maximize the full aggregated pro…ts. For maximization purposes, the 0:52 weight is not relevant, but if this objective function enters the objective function of a rival manager, the weight must be normalized to its true value. That is the purpose of the normalization $ .
Substituting equation (5) into equation (6) yields that the objective function of the manager of each …rm j 2 = can, in fact, be written as follows:
where the …rst term involves owners that are internal to the industry and the second term involves owners that are external to the industry.
The set of the above N objective function equations implicitly determines the objective function of each …rm's manager as a function of the operating pro…ts of all the …rms over which the owners of the …rm have (direct or indirectly) a …nancial and/or a corporate stake on. In order to see why this is the case, let C denote the N N control cross-ownership matrix with zero diagonal elements, jj = 0, and o¤-diagonal elements 0 jg 1 (if j 6 = g) representing the measure of …rm j's degree of control over the manager of …rm g. Let also F and C denote the (K N ) N …nancial and control common-ownership matrices with typical element kj and kj , respectively. 9 Finally, let A = diag (C | F) denote the N N diagonal matrix (with diagonal elements a jj ) formed by substituting zeros for all o¤-diagonal elements of C 0 F. In vector notation, the objective function equations become:
where $ denotes the N 1 vector of the managers objective functions, and B denotes the N N normalization diagonal matrix with diagonal elements, b jj , given by:
In order to solve for the N objective function explicitly, we make the following assumption regarding the cross-ownership control structure of the …rms in the market: 9 Note that both F and C matrices are de…ned only in terms of the set of owners external to the industry. The interests of the set of owners that are internal to the industry are taken into account in matrices F and C .
Assumption 4 The rank of (I (BC ) | ) equals the number of …rms in the market.
Under Assumption 4, matrix (I (BC ) | ) is invertible, which implies it is possible to solve for the objective function equation in terms of the vector of operating pro…ts:
where I denotes the identity matrix and the second equality is obtained by simple substitution of the aggregate pro…t equation (4). This result implies, as discussed above, that the objective function of the manager of each …rm j is entirely equivalent to a weighted sum of the operating pro…ts of all the …rms in the industry over which the owners of …rm j have (direct or indirectly) a …nancial and/or a corporate stake on:
where l jg denotes a weight that depends on the …nancial interest and the corporate control that …rm j holds over …rm g. In particular, l jg , denotes the typical element of the N N matrix L:
The weights l jg , for any j; g 2 =, capture the two dimensions of partial ownership: …nancial interest (represented in matrices F and F) and corporate control (represented in matrices C and C), as well as the two acquisition settings: cross-ownership (represented in matrices F and C ) and common-ownership (represented in matrices F and C). Without loss of generality, we normalize the weight on the own-operating pro…t to be one by dividing the objective function of the manager of each …rm j 2 = by l jj . This implies that the manager of …rm j 2 = maximizes the following, entirely equivalent, objective function:
where w jg = l jg =l jj for any j; g 2 = denotes the typical element of the N N normalized weight matrix W:
and diag (L) is the N N matrix formed by substituting zeros for all o¤-diagonal elements of L.
Our derived objective function generalizes a variety of ownership settings:
1. In the absence of cross-and common-ownership, F and C constitute null matrices and C | F constitutes a diagonal matrix. 10 This implies that
which, since C | F is diagonal, yields W = I and reduces the objective function of …rm j's manager to $ 0 j = j . In other words, with no partial ownership interests of any kind, owners typically agree that the manager should maximize operating pro…ts.
2. In cases of cross-ownership structures of …nancial interests, C and C | F constitute a null and a diagonal matrix, respectively. This yields the objective function in Flath (1992) and Dietzenbacher et al. (2000) 
3. In cases of common-ownerhip of …nancial and control interests, F and C constitute null matrices, which yields the objective function of the manager in O'Brien and Salop (2000) since
The Proposed Generalized Indicators
This section develops the two proposed generalized screening indicators for partial horizontal acquisitions within Cournot homogeneous-and Bertrand di¤erentiated-product industries.
Cournot Homogeneous-Product Industries: The Generalized HHI
In a Cournot homogeneous-product industry, we have that p 1 = : : : = p j = : : : = p N = p, for all j 2 =, with p being determined by the inverse market demand function, p (Q), where Q = P g2= q g denotes the aggregate industry output level. Under this setting, competition agencies often use market concentration as an useful indicator to screen the likely anti-competitive e¤ects of an acquisition. Our proposed generalized HHI is structurally constructed as follows. The manager of …rm j solves:
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium in quantities, q ne 1 ; : : : ; q ne j ; : : : ; q ne N and consequently Q ne = P g2= q ne g , for an interior solution is characterized by the following system of …rst-order conditions, for all j 2 =:
which makes use of the fact that w jj = 1 and @Q ne =@q j = 1. This result establishes that an extra unit of output, on the one hand, increases the objective function of the manager of …rm j by the di¤erence between price and marginal cost. However, on the other hand, this extra unit impacts the market price by @p (Q ne ) =@Q, which a¤ects the revenues (and thereby the objective function), not only of the units already produced by …rm j, but also of the units produced by all the other rival …rms g in which the owners of …rm j have, direct or indirectly, a …nancial and/or a corporate stake on (which is weighted by w jg , for j 6 = g).
Multiplying both sides of each …rst-order condition by Q ne =p (Q ne ) Q ne yields:
which after some rearranging becomes:
where the second equality makes use of the fact that = (@Q ne =@p (Q)) (p (Q) =(Q ne )) denotes the (assumed constant) absolute value of the elasticity of demand, and s ne g = q ne g =Q ne denotes the output share of …rm g, for all g 2 =. This implies that the price-cost margin to price ratio of …rm j is proportional to a weighted sum of the own-output share and the output share of all the other rival …rms in which the owners of …rm j have a stake on.
Multiplying both sides of each …rst-order condition by s ne j and summing over all …rms, we can express the simultaneous market solution as:
which establishes that the output share-weighted margins to price ratio of all the …rms in the industry is proportional (with the scale factor being 1= ) to a measure of concentration. This measure incorporates the interests (direct and indirect, involving control or not, partial or full) of all types of owners (internal and external to the industry) and establishes our proposal.
De…nition 1 The generalized HHI is given by:
where s is the N 1 vector of output market shares and W denotes the normalized weight matrix described above.
There are four important aspects about our proposed indicator:
1. In the absence of cross-and common-ownership, we have (as discussed in section 4) that all the o¤-diagonal elements of F , C and C | F are zero. This implies that W = I, which reduces the GHHI to the standard HHI: GHHI= s | s =HHI.
2. Using the standard HHI to measure the concentration of cross-or common-ownership structures induces a bias: GHHI= s | Ws = s | s + s | (W I) s =HHI+s | (W I) s, which for W 6 = I implies that GHHI di¤ers from the standard HHI.
3. In cases of cross-ownership structures of …nancial interests, we have (as discussed in section 4. In cases of common-ownership, we have (as discussed in section 4) that L = C | F, which implies that W = diag (C | F) 1 C | F. As a consequence, the GHHI reduces to O'Brien and Salop (2000) 's modi…ed HHI: GHHI= s | diag (C 0 F) 1 C | Fs.
Having established our proposed structural measure of concentration, we can relatively straightforward derive an indicator to screen the anti-competitive e¤ects of an acquisition. To do so, consider now an hypothetical acquisition, which can be partial or full, prompted by internal or external owners, and involve corporate control or not. Let= denote the subset of …rms (direct and indirectly) involved in the acquisition. Independently of the particulars of the acquisition, it will de…nitely impact the weights in matrix W for any j; g 2=. LetW denote the post-acquisition weight matrix W, with weights given byw jg for any j; g 2 =.
Note that for the subset of …rms not involved (direct or indirectly) in the acquisition, i.e., for any j; g 2 =n=, we havew jg = w jg . Finally, let q ne 1 ; : : : ;q ne j ; : : : ;q ne N andQ ne = P g2=q ne g denote the interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium in quantities post-acquisition, which, assuming a setting of no e¢ ciency gains, is characterized by the following simultaneous market solution:
wheres ne j denotes the post-acquisition output market share of …rm j 2 =.
The above result implies that the di¤erence between the post-and the pre-acquisition output share-weighted margins to price ratio is given by:
where G g HHI denotes the post-acquisition GHHI. The higher the post-acquisition GHHI and the increase in the GHHI, the greater the unilateral e¤ects impact of the acquisition on the output share-weighted margins to price ratio and, as a consequence, the greater the likelihood that competition agencies should decide to issue a second request to conduct a more detailed analysis of the acquisition.
Bertrand Di¤erentiated-Product Industries: The Generalized GUPPI
In a Bertrand di¤erentiated-product industry, competition agencies rely much more on GUPPI than HHI for diagnosing the unilateral e¤ects of an acquisition. Our proposed generalized GUPPI is structurally constructed as follows. The manager of …rm j solves:
where q g (p) is the quantity demanded for the product of …rm g, which is a function of the N 1 vector p of prices for all the products available in the industry. The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices p ne 1 ; : : : ; p ne j ; : : : ; p ne N for an interior solution is characterized by the following system of …rst-order conditions, for all j 2 =:
which makes use of the fact that w jj = 1. This result establishes that an one unit increase in price by …rm j, on the one hand, increases the …rm's revenues (and thereby the operating pro…ts and the objective function of the manager) by the number of units already produced by the …rm. However, on the other hand, it impacts the quantity demanded for the …rm's product, by @q j (p ne ) =@p j , which a¤ects the objective function of the manager of …rm by the di¤erence between price and marginal cost. Furthermore, it also impacts the quantity demand for the products of all the other rival …rms g in which the owners of …rm j have, direct or indirectly, a …nancial and/or a corporate stake on, by @q g (p ne ) =@p j , for j 6 = g, which a¤ects the objective function of the manager of …rm j by the di¤erence between the rivals price and marginal cost (which is weighted by w jg , for j 6 = g).
After some rearranging, we have that:
where DR gj = (@q g (p ne ) =@p j ) (@q j (p ne ) =@p j ) 1 denotes the diversion ratio from product j to product g, which quanti…es, if the price of product j were to rise, how much of the displaced demand for the product switches to product g.
Consider now (as discussed above) an hypothetical acquisition, which can be partial or full, prompted by internal or external owners, and involve corporate control or not. Let= denote the subset of …rms (direct and indirectly) involved in the acquisition. Independently of the particulars of the acquisition, it will de…nitely impact the weights in matrix W for any j; g 2=.
LetW denote the post-acquisition weight matrix W, with weights given by w jg for any j; g 2 = andw jg for any j; g 2=. The idea behind our proposed generalized GUPPI is to use information local to the pre-acquisition Bertrand-Nash equilibrium p ne 1 ; : : : ; p ne j ; : : : ; p ne N to predict, under a setting of no e¢ ciency gains, the directional price impacts of acquisitions (in the line of Cheung, 2011; and Ja¤e and Weyl, 2013) . To do so, we assume that the price of product j is the only variable that re-equilibrates after the acquisition, i.e., we ignore the re-equilibration of the remaining variables (all the other prices, all the quantities and all the price-e¤ects). Finally, let p ne 1 ; : : : ;p ne j ; : : : ;p ne N denote the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices post-acquisition, which for an interior solution is characterized by the following system of …rst-order conditions, for all
which, under the no re-equilibration assumption, can be re-written as:
since we have thatp ne g = p ne g for g 6 = j 2 =, q j (p ne ) = q j (p ne ) for j 2 =, and @q g (p ne ) =@p j = @q g (p ne ) =@p j for all g 2 =.
The above result implies that the di¤erence between the post-and pre-acquisition price of product j 2= is given by:
which establishes that product j's upward pricing pressure, gross of e¢ ciency gains, is a function of the change in the weights in matrix W, of the pre-acquisition price-cost margins, and of the diversion ratios, all of which referent solely to the products in=, i.e., to the products of the …rms involved in the acquisition. Multiplying both sides of the above result by 1=p ne j establishes our proposal.
De…nition 2
The generalized GUPPI for product j 2= is given by:
wherew jg w jg denotes, the change in the normalized weight matrix elements post-and preacquisition for products j and g 2=, p ne j and p ne g denotes the pre-acquisition price of product j and g 2=, respectively, mc g denotes the pre-acquisition marginal cost of product g 2=, and DR gj denotes the pre-acquisition the diversion ratio from product j to product g 2=.
The higher the level of GUPPI for each product involved in the acquisition, the greater the unilateral impact of the acquisition on their prices and, as a consequence, the greater the likelihood that competition agencies should decide to issue a second request to conduct a more detailed analysis of the acquisition. Finally, note that, in the absence of cross-and commonownership, we have (as discussed in section 4) that all the o¤-diagonal elements of F , C and C | F are zero, which implies W = I. In cases of full acquisitions, this leads to (w jg w jg ) = 1 for j; g 2= and g 6 = j, which reduces the GGUPPI to the standard GUPPI:
Empirical Application
This section presents an empirical application of the GHHI and the GGUPPI to several acqui- In other words, the DoJ approved Gillette's 22:9% stake in Wilkinson Sword after being assured that this stake would be passive. Indeed, Gillette claimed it was merely making an investment. However, even when the acquiring …rm cannot in ‡uence the conduct of the target …rm, the partial acquisition may still raise antitrust concerns. The reason being that the partial acquisition may reduce the incentive of the acquiring …rm to compete aggressively because it shares in the losses thereby in ‡icted on that rival. We examine this question by screening the unilateral e¤ects of this stake. As a comparison, we also examine Gillette's initial proposed 100% acquisition of Wilkinson Sword to screen the counterfactual unilateral e¤ects have Gillette not voluntarily rescinded the acquisition of Eemland's wet shaving razor business in the US.
Finally, we also screen two additional hypothetical acquisitions. We examine an hypothetical acquisition of 22:9% voting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword by Gillette, in order to illustrate the di¤erential impact of acquiring a voting and a nonvoting equity interest. Further, we examine an hypothetical acquisition of 22:9% voting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword by Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Gillette's largest external owner, in order to illustrate the di¤erential impact of an acquisition giving rise to a cross-and a common-ownership structure.
The Normalized Weight Matrix
In order to apply the two proposed indicators to the above setting, we have to calculate the normalized weight matrix W. To do so, we require information on both the …nancial and the corporate control structure of the …ve …rms in the industry. We make the following assumption regarding the measure of each owner's degree of control over the manager of a …rm:
Assumption 5 The control weight an owner has over the decision making of a …rm is equal to the share of voting rights she owns in the …rm.
Assumption 5 constitutes a natural benchmark, since, as discussed above, the degree of corporate control an owner has (over the decision making of a …rm) is a function of the voting rights she holds in the …rm. However, it is merely illustrative. As suggested by Goppelsroeder et al. (2008) , we can, alternatively, measure the owners' degree of control (over the decision making of a …rm) by the Shapley-Shubik (1954) power index or the Banzhaf (1965) power index.
We begin by describing the …nancial and the corporate control structure of the …ve …rms preacquisition, i.e., prior to December 20, 1989. To do so, we make use of two sources of information:
for US-based …rms, we analyze the proxy statements (schedule 14A) …lled by …rms with the Securities and Exchange Commission, while for Europe-based …rms, we analyze the Commission of the European Communities'o¢ cial decision regarding the full acquisition initially proposed.
Two comments are in order relative to this information. First, although we are describing the pre-acquisition 1989'structures, we use data from 1990, which was the earliest year available. 11
This implicitly assumes that from 1989 to 1990 the …nancial and control structure of the …rms did not su¤er relevant variations other than the ones described above. Second, public data is restricted to identify large external owners, whose interest (directly or together with a¢ liates) typically exceeds 5%. As a consequence, we must make an assumption relative to the …nancial and control weight of the remaining minority external owners. We make the following:
Assumption 6 Minority external owners do not engage in common-ownership.
Assumption 6 constitutes a natural benchmark and it is merely illustrative. It implies that each …rm's minority external owners agree on the best strategy to pursue. As a consequence, both indicators are invariant to the …nancial and control weigh of each of those owners. Therefore, we may aggregate without loss of generality the …nancial and control weigh of each …rm's minority external owners into a single …ctitious external owner. Naturally, in cases involving common-ownership among the minority external owners, this aggregation is not innocuous, since those owners will have con ‡icting views on the best strategy to pursue. In those cases, the …nancial and control weight of each owner matters, which implies that a careful evaluation of all the individual weights is essential. It suggests that, pre-acquisition, the …rms in the industry did not engage in cross-ownership. Having described the …nancial and the corporate control structure of the …ve …rms, we can begin to convert that information into the four matrices that are instrumental in computing the weight matrix W: matrices F and C , which capture cross-ownership among internal owners, and matrices F and C, which capture common-ownership from external owners.
We address …rst the former. Matrices F and C denote the …nancial and corporate control cross-ownership matrices, respectively. In our application, they are captured by (5 5) matrices.
The diagonal elements are, by de…nition, zero. The o¤-diagonal elements, jg and jg , represent the …nancial and corporate control cross-ownership stake of …rm j on …rm g, respectively, for all j 6 = g 2 =.
In both cases, the rows and columns are ordered from j = 1 to j = 5. Given that pre-acquisition …rms in the industry do not engage in cross-ownership, we have that jg = 0 and jg = 0 for all j 6 = g 2 =. This implies that F and C pre-acquisition constitute null 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 C = 2 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
:
Having constructed matrices C and F, we have all the necessary information to compute pre-acquisition matrices A and B, as described in section 3:3. In our application, this computation yields:
A = 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
; which implies that, absent cross-and common-ownership, and barring any market imperfections that preclude e¢ cient contracting between the owners and the manager, the former agree (and give the appropriate incentives) that the latter should maximize own-operating pro…ts. This constitutes the pre-acquisition benchmark by which all the four acquisitions discussed above are going to be evaluated below.
Gillette Acquires a 100% Voting Equity Interest in Wilkinson Sword
The (hypothetical) acquisition of 100% voting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword by Gillette gives rise to a cross-ownership structure in the industry (since Wilkinson Sword's ownership changes from an external owner, Eemland, to an internal owner). Comparing with the preacquisition structure, this implies changes to matrices F and C , as well as to matrices F and C, which induce (Appendix A describes the step-by-step computational details) the following 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
This result implies that the managers of Wilkinson Sword and Gillette are, post-acquisition, perfectly aligned. The two …rms behave, e¤ectively, as a single entity, in the sense that their owners agree (and give the appropriate incentives) that managers should maximize their joint operating pro…ts.
Gillette Acquires a 22.9% Voting Equity Interest in Wilkinson Sword
In order to illustrate the di¤erential impact of a full merger and a partial acquisition (of a voting equity interest), we consider here the (hypothetical) acquisition of 22:9% voting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword by Gillette. This acquisition gives rise to a partial cross-ownership structure in the industry, in which Gillette and Eemland, an internal and an external owner, respectively, share …nancial and corporate control interests in Wilkinson Sword. Comparing with the pre-acquisition structure, this implies changes to matrices F and C , as well as to matrices F and C, which induce (Appendix A describes the step-by-step computational details) the following post-acquisition normalized weight matrixW:
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 0. 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.229 1.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
This result implies that the manager of Wilkinson Sword should maximize own-operating pro…ts. 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 1.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
This result implies that the manager of Wilkinson Sword should maximize own-operating pro…ts.
The reason being that although Wilkinson Sword has two owners, only one of them, Eemland, has control over the manager. And Eemland only cares about the returns of the equity it holds in Wilkinson Sword. Furthermore, it also implies that the manager of Gillette should maximize a weighted average of Gillette and Wilkinson Sword's operating pro…ts, since post-acquisition Gillette's largest external owner, Berkshire Hathaway, holds stakes on both …rms. This suggests that partial acquisitions by external owners that participate in more than one competitor …rm align the interests of the …rms involved in the acquisition in the same qualitative vein as an acquisition by internal owners. The only di¤erence is solely on the weight given to the rival …rm operations.
The Generalized HHI
Competition agencies often use market concentration as an useful indicator to screen the likely competitive e¤ects of an acquisition. In order to apply our proposed generalized market concentration measure, the generalized HHI, to a particular setting, we require information not only about the normalized weight matrix W (discussed above), but also about the pre-acquisition output shares of the …rms in the industry. This latter information is included in the data submitted in a typical noti…cation to a competition agency, and for that reason does not increase the information requirements of unilateral e¤ects analyses. Table 3 presents the pre-acquisition output shares of each …rm j 2 = f1; : : : ; 5g in our illustration. The data is adapted from the text published by the DoJ (1990) We use the normalized weight matrices W andW calculated above, and the DoJ (1990) output share data to compute the generalized HHI pre-and post-acquisition for each of the cases discussed. To do so, we make use of equation (21). The results are summarized in Table 4 . The pre-acquisition industry has a generalized HHI of 3; 106 (= (1) 2 + (20) 2 + (14) 2 + (3) 2 + (50) 2 ).
This result makes clear that in the absence of cross-and common-ownership, the GHHI reduces to the standard HHI. Further, it suggests that the wet shaving industry was highly concentrated even before December 20, 1989.
The 100% . This result suggests that a full merger induces a higher increase in concentration than a partial acquisition of a voting interest. In the particular case at hands, the acquisition would have involved an increase in concentration of less than 100 points, which implies that it was unlikely to have adverse competitive e¤ects, a result which ordinarily requires no further analysis.
However, Gillette did not consider a partial voting equity interest acquisition, but a non- . This result suggests that the acquisition of a control stake induces a higher increase in concentration than the acquisition of solely a …nancial stake. In the particular case at hands, the acquisition involved an increase in concentration of less than 100 points, which implies that it was also unlikely to have adverse competitive e¤ects. This seems to validate the decision of DoJ not to challenge the operation. A result that suggests that acquisitions that give rise to common-ownership structures in which external owners partially participate in more than one competitor …rm may induce a lower Generalized HHI denotes the change in GHHI pre-and post-acquisition. increase in concentration than acquisitions that give rise to cross-ownership structures.
The Generalized GUPPI
In order to apply our proposed generalized GUPPI to a particular setting, we require information on the normalized weight matrices pre-and post-acquisition for all …rms, as well as information on the pre-acquisition prices, margins, and diversion ratios for the …rms which weights exhibit changes pre-and post-acquisition. We already discussed the calculation of the normalized weight matrices pre-and post-acquisition for each of the cases under examination. An analysis of the results makes clear that, in all cases, only the weights associated with Wilkinson Sword and Gillette do change. This implies that, in our application, we require information solely on the pre-acquisition prices, margins, and diversion ratios of those two …rms. This information is included in the data submitted in a typical noti…cation to a competition agency, and for that reason does not increase the information requirements of unilateral e¤ects analyses. than Wilkinson Sword's.
We use the normalized weight matrices W andW calculated above, and Table 5 's data to compute the generalized GUPPI for each of the acquisitions discussed. To do so, we make use of equation (30). The results are summarized in Table 6 . According to this indicator, the 100% voting equity interest acquisition in Wilkinson Sword initially proposed by Gillette would have induced a slight upward pricing pressure in industry's products. In order to see why, note that the di¤erence betweenW and W is given by:
GGUPPI 5 = (0:229) (0:375) (0:225) = (4:036) = 0:479%. This result suggests that the acquisition was unlikely to have adverse competitive e¤ects, since it involved an upward pricing pressure of only 0:479% in Gillette's products. Further, it con…rms the idea, suggested by the generalized HHI, that the acquisition of a control stake induces more adverse competitive e¤ects than the acquisition of solely a …nancial stake, since the upward pricing pressure is lower than in the previous case.
Finally, had the 22:9% nonvoting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword been acquired by Berkshire Hathaway, Gillette's largest external owner, the upward pricing pressure in the industry's products would also have been very small. In order to see why, note that, in this case, the di¤erence betweenW and W would have been given by: 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
; which indicates that only the weight of Gillette's manager on Wilkinson Sword's operating pro…ts changes. This implies that solely Gillette's products will exhibit an upward pricing pressure. The acquisition's GGUPPIs are thus given by: GGUPPI j = 0 for j = f1; 2; 3; 4g and GGUPPI 5 = (0:035) (0:375) (0:225) = (4:036) = 0:073%. This implies that the upward pricing pressure in Gillette's products induced by Berkshire Hathaway's 22:9% nonvoting equity interest acquisition in Wilkinson Sword is lower than the one induced by Gillette's direct 22:9% nonvoting equity interest acquisition (since Berkshire Hathaway holds solely a share of Gillette).
A result that con…rms, as suggested by the generalized HHI, that acquisitions that give rise to common-ownership structures in which external owners partially participate in more than one competitor …rm may induce a lower upward pricing pressure than acquisitions that give rise to cross-ownership structures. 
Conclusions
This paper puts forward proposals that suggest how to improve the two most traditional indicators -the Hel…ndahl-Hirschman Index and the Gross Upward Price Pressure Index -used by competition agencies, typically in phase I-type of investigations, to screen potential anticompetitive unilateral e¤ects regarding partial horizontal acquisitions. The proposed generalized indicators can deal with all types of acquisitions that may lessen competition in the industry: acquisitions by owners that are internal to the industry (rival …rms) and engage in cross-ownership, as well as acquisitions by owners that are external to the industry and engage in common-ownership. Furthermore, these indicators can deal with direct and indirect acquisitions, which may or may not correspond to control, and nest full mergers as a special case.
We provide an empirical application of the two indicators to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. The results seem to suggest that (i) a full merger induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial controlling acquisition involving the same …rms, (ii) a partial controlling acquisition induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than a partial non-controlling acquisition involving the same …rms and the same …nancial stakes, and (iii) an acquisition by owners that are internal to the industry induces higher unilateral anti-competitive e¤ects than an acquisition (involving the same …rms and the same stakes) by external owners that participate in more than one competitor …rm. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
We now address the latter. LetF andC denote the common-ownership matrices postacquisition. All elements relative to the …nancial and corporate control ownership stakes on American Safety Razor, BIC, Warner-Lambert, and Gillette remain unchanged:~ kj = kj and~ kj = kj for j 2 f1; 2; 3; 5g and all k 2 n=. Further, the …nancial and corporate control ownership stakes on Wilkinson Sword remain unchanged for all external owners except Eemland :~ k4 = k4 and~ k4 = k4 for all k 2 n= and k 6 = f16g. However, the …nancial and corporate control ownership stakes of Eemland on Wilkinson Sword are reduced to~ 16;4 = 0 (since Eemland sells the full 100% equity interest in the operation) and to~ 16;4 = 0 (since the equity interest transacted involved voting), respectively. This implies the following post-acquisitionF andC matrices: 
